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DecliningUnionization in Construction:
The Facts and The Reasons
ABSTRACT
This paper documents and examines the forces behind the decline of
unionization in the construction industry. The proportion of construction
workers belonging to unions has dropped from slightly less than one-half in
1966 to less than one-third in 1984. The employment share of unioncontractors
has declined even further because of the fraction of union membersworking in
the open shop rose from 29 to 46 percent between 1973 and 1981.Initially, an
important factor in the initial decline in percentage unionized was the growth
in the union-nonunion wage gap between 1967 and 1973. However, thegap did not
widen any further after 1973 and actually has narrowed substantially since
1978. A key subsequent factor has been the erosion of theproductivity
advantage of union contractors, which dropped substantially between 1972 and
1977 and vanished by 1982. The decline of unionization is unrelated tochanges
in worker characteristics or changes in the mix and location of construction
activity.
Steven G. Allen
Department of Economics and Business




BITNET:NSALLEN @TUCCThe share of nonagricultural workers belonging to unions has declined from
34 percent in 1954 to 19 percent in 1984. The reasons for this decline remain
largely a matter of conjecture. Farber (1985) and Freeman and Medoff (1984) have
found that some of the decline can be statistically attributed to structural
changes in worker and job characteristics, such as the growth of the service
sector and the rise in the proportion of female workers. Another reason, pointed
out by Freeman and Medoff, Freeman (1985) and Dickens and Leonard (1985), is that
the percentage of nonunion workers who are organized through NLRB elections has
dropped substantially. These studies indicate that, if unions become no more
successful in organizing new workers than they have been over the last tenyears,
percentage unionized will continue to decline asymptotically to a level of
between 10 and 15 percent.
As the authors of all of these studies recognize, such explanations raise as
many questions as they answer. The structural change argument cannot address the
question of why the share of union workers has changed within particular groups
of workers. In particular, it cannot explain why unionization has been falling
in manufacturing and construction and why it has been rising in the public
sector. This argument also cannot deal with the possibility that the structural
changes are not exogenous. One reason behind the declining share of the
manufacturing sector and the rising share of the service sector could very well
be the lower profit rates among establishments covered by collective bargaining
agreements.
The organizing success argument is more illuminating as it pinpoints a major
source of the decline in unionism within particular sectors. However, research
in this area has not progressed far enough to explain why union organizing
campaigns are bearing so little fruit. Some have attributed this to increased
managerial opposition, as indicated by the rising number of employer unfair
labor practices. It is not yet clear whether this increased opposition results2
from changed perceptions of the cost of being unionized or from increased odds of
preventing unionization. The declining success of union organizing efforts may
also be attributable to incentives within the unions themselves that seeni to put
a high premium on providing services to the current membership and a low premium
on organizing new members. Another possibility is reduced demand by workers for
union coverage, a possible consequence of changes in nonunion personnel
practices, increased government regulation of the work place, or a drop in the
perceived economic gains from union coverage. Regardless of the reasons for the
slowdown in union organizing, this argument cannot account for changes in
unionization in sectors of the economy where NLRB elections have little or no
role to play in union organizing or changes resulting from union-nonunion
differences in the growth of employment across establishments.
This paper represents a first attempt to bring the economic forces behind
both the structural change and organizing success arguments to the forefront in
explaining changes in percentage unionized over time. The focus is on a single
sector of the economy- -the construction industry. In addition to building on my
earlier work in this area, this has three distinct methodological advantages.
First, most of the structural change factors likely to contaminate a broader
analysis are removed. The labor force has remained fairly homogeneous (males in
mostly skilled occupations) over the period examined. Even though there have
been some major changes in the mix and location of construction activity, it will
be shown below that they have had no impact on unionization. Second, short job
durations make NLRB elections largely irrelevant to union organizing efforts in
construction, thus eliminating to a great extent the impact of legal factors.
Third, it is quite unlikely there is a single all-purpose explanation of the
decline in percentage unionized that applies to all sectors of the economy.
Instead, the answer is likely to vary, depending on such factors as government3
regulation, import competition, and the structure of collectivebargaining.
Focusing on specific sectors is likely to lead to a richer andmore accurate
explanation of unionism's decline. Although the results of thisstudy may very
well be specific to construction, the procedures used herecan be applied easily
to other industries.
The results reported below are to be interpreted in terms of thefollowing
simple theoretical model. The union unilaterally sets thewage for work covered
by collective bargaining agreements. The wage maximizes the union'sobjective
function subject to the constraints outlined below.Analytically, this
assuniption eliminates the bargaining process itself from the model. Inaddition,
it serves as a fairly close approximation toreality in the construction
industry, as acknowledged by both critics of the building trades(Northrup
(1984)) and more sympathetic observers (Mills (1972)). Given the unionwage,
contractors determine whether it is more profitable to hire unionor nonunion
labor. This decision hinges on expectedwage and productivity differences
between union and nonunion labor for each particularcontractor. These
differences are likely to vary with such factorsas project size, location, and
type of construction. Contractors who used union labor in the previousperiod
must also take into account costs associated with switching to nonunionlabor.
These are similar to the fixed costs of union avoidance inLazear (1983). In
practice they may represent the legal costs of establishing aseparate nonunion
subsidiary (referred to as "going double-breasted") or the risk of strikesor
violence. The initial distribution of union status is assumedexogenous.
Once the union wage and the number of establishments in the unionsector
have been set, union employment is demand-determined.Employment will be less
than the number of union members unless full employment for itsmembership is the
only objective of the union (in which case unions are unlikely to exist). Union4
members who do not get jobs covered by collective bargaining agreements either
work for nonunion contractors or drop out of the labor force. The market for
nonunion labor operates in textbook fashion, conditional on the union wage.
In this simple model, declines in unionization result whenever the
profitability of operating under collective bargaining agreements falls. This
will happen when (1) the union-nonunion wage gap increases, (2) the union-
nonunion productivity gap decreases, or (3) the cost of switching from union to
nonunion construction decreases. Lacking any information on the last factor,
the focus here will be on changes in wage and productivity gaps. Before looking
at that evidence, I begin with the facts on trends in the share of construction
employees who say they are union members, focusing on data for the last twenty
years which have not been reported together previously. I also present the first
set of estimates of the percentage of union members working in nonunion
construction.
I. The Facts on Unionization in Construction
Everyone affiliated with the construction industry knows that the market
share of union contractors has declined substantially over the last twenty
years. There is little consensus on the magnitude of the decline or the current
market share. For instance Robert Ceorgine, president of the Building and
Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, claimed in 1981, "The percentage
of unionized construction is much higher than the 40% everyone talks about and is
higher than 50%" (Engineering News-Record, Nov. 5, 1981). On the other hand, the
Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC), an open shop trade association,
claimed a 20 percent market share for the open shop in 1969, a 30 percent share
in 1973, and a 65 percent share in 1983. To get a more accurate picture of
the magnitude and the timing of the growth of the open shop, the percentage of5
workers belonging to unions or covered by collective bargainingagreements for
various years between 1966 and 1984 is compiled in Table 1. A continuoussource
of this information is the May Current Population Survey (CPS) publicuse tapes
for 1973 through 1981. Union membership status can also be ascertained for1966
in the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEa) and for 1970 in the March 1971
CPS. Coverage by collective bargaining agreements for all construction
contractors in the Expenditures for Employee Compensation (EEC) Surveys for
1968-72 were compiled by Freeman and Medoff (1979). These are supplemented in
Table 1 with results from special reports released by BLS between 1966 and 1971
on each two-digit construction industry. A question on collective bargaining
coverage is also available on the CPS since 1978. All of the data in Table 1 are
compiled from published sources except the May 1973-81 and 1983 CPS, which I
computed using CPS sampling weights to make them comparable to the published
data.
The best series for making long-run comparisons is the union membership data
for all occupations. Between 1966 and 1973, there was little change in
unionization. Percentage unionized actually grew by 0.5 percentage points between
1966 and 1970, followed by a 2.5 percentage point drop between 1970 and 1973.
The evidence for construction workers (the term used by BLS to describeb1ue
collar workers in construction) over this period is more difficult to use for
comparisons over time, as the 1966 data exclude females and the 1970 data include
government workers. Union membership rates are lower for each of these groups
than for the rest of the sample. Patterns in the 1973-75 micro data indicate
that the construction worker estimate for 1966 is 0.2 percentage points too high
and the estimate for 1970 is 1.4 percentage points too low. Given these
adjustments, the data on unionization for construction workers follow the same6
pattern as the data for all occupations- -no change between 1966 and 1970, and a
small drop between 1970 and 1973.
The EEC data on collective bargaining coverage cannot be used to analyze
trends in the share of union contractors, but it is a useful independent source
of information on the size of the union sector in the late l960s and early
1970s. The estimates of collective bargaining coverage are much larger than
those for union membership in the same period. This is attributable to right to
work laws and the EEC questionnaire (which asks if a majority of an establish-
ment's production workers are covered by collective bargaining rather than for
the percentage covered). Whereas the exact influence of each of these factors
cannot be determined, the coverage estimates suggest that the employment share of
the union sector was between 50 and 55 percent of all construction workers during
this period. This is well within the range of estimates reported by Lewis (1963,
p. 250) for various years between 1939 and 1960, suggesting that the unionized
share of construction labor markets was quite stable until the early l970s.
The employment share of the union sector continued to decline at a moderate
pace between 1973 and 1977. The percentage for workers in all occupations
dropped by 3.7 points; construction workers, 3.1 points.
The big drops in the employment share for the union sector took place in
1977-78 and after 1981. The percentage of workers in all occupations who were
union members fell by 3.8 percentage points between May 1977 and 1978. It fell
by 4.5 percentage points for construction workers. Percentage unionized stayed
at this level in 1979 and 1980. The 1981 data indicate a 2 percentage point gain
in the employment share for all occupations and a 1.6 percentage point gain for
construction workers. These gains were wiped out within the next two years.
Between May 1981 and 1983 the union share for all occupations fell by 4.6
percentage points. It dropped 4.0 percentage points in 1984 and another 1.27
points in 1985. As a result, between 1966 and 1986 percentage union plummeted
19.4percentage points, a 47 percent decline. Almost all of this decline took
place after 1973.
The collective bargaining coverage estimates computed from the CPS for 1978
through 1986 tell basically the same story as the union membership estimates- -the
share of union contractors fell dramatically between 1981 and 1983. The gap
between the membership and coverage estimates seems also to have narrowed
considerably over this period.
In summary, the facts about the decline in percentage unionized are:
1.The union sector never dominated the construction industry to the
extent that its stoutest proponents and harshest critics have
maintained. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the employment share of
unionized contractors was about 50 to 55 percent of all construction
workers, roughly the same as it has been since 1939.
2.A gradual decline in percentage unionized began after 1970 and
continued through 1977. Over this period the proportion of union
workers declined by 5 to 6 percentage points.
3.The sharpest drops in the proportion of union workers took place
between May 1977 and May 1978 and between May 1981 and 1985. Whereas
more than one of three employees in construction belonged to unions in
1977, less than one of four were union members in 1986.
Depressing as these figures may be for the building trades, there is even
more bad news. These calculations have ignored the supposedly growing proportion
of union members who work for nonunion contractors. Although this cannot be
documented as precisely as the proportion of workers belonging to unions, the
next section presents estimates of the importance of this factor.
II. Union Cards. Nonunion Jobs
To estimate the proportion of union members working in the nonunion sector,
data from quarterly BLS reports on union wage rates for building trades were
merged into the CPS public use files for 1973 through 1981. BLS reports wages
(and benefits) for six skilled occupations (bricklayers, carpenters,8
electricians, painters, plasterers, and plumbers) and forbuilding laborers for
over one hundred cities. To make themerger of these data sets a manageable task
and to impute union wages for those who donot work in those occupations or live
in those cities, the following procedureswere followed. Only the lowest wage in
the six skilled occupations (usuallypainters) was merged into the CPS, along
with the wage for laborers. For (1)persons living in SMSAs for which no BLS
union wage data were reported, (2) those notliving in SMSAs, and (3) those
living in SMSAs not identified in the CPS, the lowest skilledwage and laborer
wage across all SMSAs in their state (or region forpersons whose state was not
identified in the 1973-76 CPS) were merged into theCPS. In a few cases, union
wage rates were unreported for laborers in a particular state. Whenthis
happened, operatives and laborers belonging to unions inthat state were dropped
from the sample.
The proportion of union membersworking at less than union rates was then
calculated by comparing the self reportedwage in the CPS to the union wage. The
union wage for skilled workers wasassigned to craftsmen; the union wage for
laborers was assigned to operatives andlaborers; half the union wage for
skilled workers was assigned to apprentices.
Before presenting and discussing theseestimates, a few comments about
sources of bias and measurement error are in order. Inmaking judgments about
how to merge union wage rates into theCPS, the tendency was always to produce a
downwardly biased estimate of the proportion of union membersreceiving nonunion
wages. Workers in relatively high wage occupations, such as electriciansand
plumbers, always have their CPS wage compared toa union wage from a relatively
low wage occupation. The unionwage data are reported for July of the previous
year. This was done to offset variation across SMSAs in thetiming of contract9
negotiations and variable lags across SMSAs in reporting new agreements in the
seemingly more appropriate April survey.
These judgments were intended to offset three potentially important and
unavoidable sources of upward bias. The first is reporting errors in union
status. Some nonunion workers will be mistakenly identified as union members,
and in most cases will be receiving wages below union scale. The other two
important sources arise from the lack of detail in the BLS union wage data. In
some areas lower wage rates are paid for skilled occupations in certain types of
construction, especially residential work. These are not reported by BLS and,
even if they were, could not be merged into the CPS because it does not report
type of construction. The other problem is that workers in some excluded
occupations, such as floor layers and terrazzo workers, have lower union wage
scales than workers in the six occupations reported by BLS.
There are two additional sources of pure measurement error: errors in
reporting wages in the CPS and exclusion from the BLS union wage data of smaller
SMSAs and rural areas. Although the latter may seem at first glance to be a
source of upward bias, the use of multicounty and statewide bargaining units in
many states means that rates in rural areas can be equal to or near the highest
rates in that state. Even if the very lowest union rates in each state may not be
observed, assigning them to all rural workers would introduce additional downward
bias, the magnitude of which cannot be determined. As it turns out, the
proportion of union members receiving wages below union scale is lower in rural
areas and smaller SMSAs than in the larger SMSAs identified in the CPS in eight
out of the nine years in the sample.
The magnitude of these biases (in percentage points) is assessed in detail
in the appendix and summarized below:10
1.Sources of upward bias
A. Errors in reporting union status 7.5
B.Lower rates in residential or other
types of construction 6.1
C.Trades with lowest wages excluded
from BLS 1.8
D.Total 15.4
2. Sources of downward bias
A.Union wage computed from lowest
wage occupation -7.4




These adjustment factors show that the estimates of the ratio of union members
working in the open shop are likely to be very close to the mark.
The results in Table 2 show that in 1973 almost three of every ten union
members were working in the open shop. This proportion rose to 35 percent in
1979 and 1980, and rose dramatically again in 1981 to 46 percent. These
estimates suggest demand conditions play a strong role in determining whether
union members get jobs in the union sector. The proportion working in the open
shop rose during both the 1975 and 1979-81 downturns in construction activity.
Union members in the Northeast and Midwest are most likely to be working in the
open shop.
How sensitive are these estimates to the procedures used in deriving them?
One way of determining this is to use 80, 90 or 110 percent of the imputed union
wage as the basis for comparison to the CPS wage. This produced the following
results for 1973-78 combined:
Percentage of imputed union Percentage of union members





The estimate is clearly quite sensitive to the definition of the unionwage.
However, even the smallest estimates show that a substantial proportion of union
members are not being paid union scale.
Once adjustments are made for proportion working in the nonunion sector
the decline in unionization becomes larger in both absolute and relativeterms.
Instead of the 5.4 percentage point and 12 percent proportional drop between 1973
and 1981 observed for union membership, there is now a 10.4percentage point and
a 33 percent proportional drop in the share of workers who are union members
and are receiving union wages. As these calculations ignore the phenomenon of
nonunion workers covered by collective bargaining agreements, the trueemployment
share of union contractors is underestimated, although it is doubtful that this
has much effect on the trend.
These figures provide a reasonably accurate picture of the market share for
union members. They have lost so much of the market to theopen shop over the
last ten years that if this trend continues another five to tenyears, they will
no longer be a significant factor in construction labor markets.
III. Structural Changes Within Construction
One possible set of reasons for the decline in percentage unionized in
construction is changes in worker characteristics and changes in the mix and
location of construction projects. For instance, today workers areyounger,
craftsman represent a smaller share of employment, and a higher proportion of
workers are women than ten years ago. All these factors would lead to lower
levels of unionization. There also have been important changes in the structure
of the industry. The Northeast now accounts for a smaller share of total
construction than it did ten years ago. Because of the Davis-Bacon Act and
prevailing wage laws covering construction for state and local governments, union12
contractors have always been able to capture a large proportion of the
construction work done for governments. Government construction expenditures
have grown much less rapidly than private sector expenditures, so this could also
be an important factor in the decline of unionism in the industry. Although
there have been factors acting in the opposite direction to increase
unionization, such as a more educated work force and a rising share of
construction in the Pacific division, it is still possible that much of the
decrease in percentage unionized is attributable to such "exogenous" factors.
To examine this possibility further, Table 3 reports annual estimates from
the CPS of the percentage of workers belonging to unions between 1973 and 1981 by
by region. There were 20 to 30 percent declines in unionization in every
region except the Midwest, where proportion unionized stayed at roughly the same
level throughout most of the period. This makes it unlikely that regional
shifts can explain much of the decline in unionism over this period.
To expand the scope of the analysis beyond regional shifts, a linear
probability model of union membership was estimated over the 1973-1978 CPS.
The sample includes all occupational categories to account for trends in the use
of union foremen. The independent variables include age and itssquare; years of
schooling; dummy variables for occupation (8), two-digit industry (3), Census
division (8), race (2), sex, marital status (1), year (5), and SMSA status (2);
and the proportions of construction activity in each state of government,
maintenance and repair, single family home, apartment, retail, educational,
hospital, heavy, industrial, office, and highway construction. These market
share variables are included because percentage unionized varies greatly across
different types. of construction. Their coefficients should indicate how
variation in the type of construction affects unionization. To evaluate the
impact of changes in worker characteristics and changes in the mix and location13
of construction projects, the difference in the mean of each independentvariable
between 1973 and 1981 (1972 and 1982 for the mix of constructionvariables) was
multiplied by its coefficient. The sum of these products represents the
predicted change in fraction unionized over this period.
The results (summarized in Table 4 and reported in complete detail in
Appendix Table A) show that only two sets of "exogenous" factors contributed at
all to the decline in proportion unionized. Substitution of white collar for
blue collar labor resulted in a decline of 2.4 percentage points, and smaller
proportions of male and married workers resulted in a decline of 0.8percentage
points. When all of the other factors--changes in labor quality, two-digit
industry, location and mix of construction- -are taken into account, the model
predicts an increase of 2.6 percentage points in unionization. The reason for
the predicted increase is •the 3.4 percentage point growth associated withchanges
in the mix of construction, arising largely from the increased share of
maintenance and repair work. Because of the dubious magnitude of some of the
coefficients of the mix of construction variables, the model was also estimated
without them. The coefficients for the remaining variables changedvery little.
The new model predicts a 1.1 percentage point decline in unionization, which is
very close to the prediction one would derive from Table 4 by ignoring the type
of construction variables.
The key point of this analysis is that the structural hypothesis is
incapable of explaining the decline in unionization between 1973 and 1981.
Across all occupations, percentage unionized fell by 6.6 points. The models
predict either a 1.1 point drop or a 2.6 point increase. No more than 17 percent
(1.16.6) of the decline in unionization can be explained in terms of exogenous
factors. This explanation is unsatisfactory not only on statistical grounds but14
also because it relies upon the dubious assumption that unions did not cause the
most important "exogenous" factor -- substitutionof white for blue collar labor.
IV.Changesin the Union-Nonunion Wage Gap
Wage cuts and freezes have become commonplace in the construction industry.
For contracts signed in 1984, the average increase in wages over the life of the
contract was lower (1.0 percent) in construction than in any other major sector
of the economy. The most frequently stated rationale for these wage adjustments
is that they are necessary to preserve jobs in the union sector. This belief is
based on the premise that union wage rates grew so rapidly in the late 1960s and
the 1970s that the building trades in effect priced themselves out of the market.
To examine this possibility, wage gap estimates for private wage and salary
workers were obtained from the May 1973-1981 and 1983 CPS using a variety of
specifications. The basic model regresses the log of the wage (or average hourly
earnings for those who are not paid by the hour) on age and its square,
schooling, and dummies for union membership, occupation, industry, region, race,
sex, marital status, and SMSA residence. It was estimated across all occupations
as well as across construction workers only. These estimates are supplemented in
Table 5 with estimates from Ashenfelter (1978) for 1967 from the SEO and 1973 and
1975 from the CPS. His model contains interaction terms with occupation,
industry, and union status in a model estimated across all occupations and
industries. Inclusion of Ashenfelter's 1973 and 1975 estimates is necessary to
make accurate comparisons of the wage gap between 1967 and later years.
Ashenfelter's results show that the wage gap grew from 37.7 to 53.7 percent
between 1967 and 1973, and stayed at 53.7 percent in 1975. The wage gap
estimates in 1973 and 1975 are slightly higher (see column 4) when the equation
is estimated over a more restricted sample than Ashenfelter's (construction15
workers) in a specification without any interactions. In the years immediately
after 1975, there is no trend in the wage gap estimates. Thegap widened
from 57 to 61 percent in 1976 and stayed at 60 percent in 1977 and 1978.
The main finding in Table 5 is that the wage gap actuallygot smaller after
1978. The gap fell to 43 percent in 1979 and remained no larger than 50percent
in 1980, 1981 and 1983. The reasons for this drop are not yet clear. Mellow
(1982) reports similar drops in the wage gap in 1979 for all workers. One
possible reason could be differences between union and nonunionwage
responsiveness to the business cycle or inflation. Regardless of the reason, it
is impossible to use this evidence to claim that thewage gap continued to widen
after the mid-l970s. The results for all construction occupations in column 2
show the same pattern- -the wage gap was shrinking, not growing, in the late l97Os
and early 1980s.
To examine the sensitivity of these results to the set of variables included
as controls, two additional specifications of the model were estimated: one from
which certain workers characteristics (age, schooling,race, sex, and marital
status) were dropped from the model and another from which all other control
variables (region, occupation, industry, and SMSA residence) were dropped. These
results are reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5. They show exactly thesame
pattern as the wage gap estimates obtained when holding these factors constant.
All of these estimates are based on the assumptions that no union members
work for nonunion contractors and no nonunion workers are employed by union
contractors. Collective bargaining coverage is reported by nonunion workers in
the 1978-1981 and 1983 CPS, allowing the construction of a new union variable
equal to one if the respondent is either a union member or works on a job covered
by collective bargaining. The coefficients for this new variable in column 7 are
about the same as those for the union membership variable over this period. To16
examine the impact of the second assumption, another union variable was created
to be equal to one if the respondent was a union member and was receiving awage
at or above union scale. Results for this variable in column 8 show a sustained
increase in the wage gap through 1977. However, after 1977 this set ofwage gap
estimates also falls to values that are no greater than those for 1973.
Another way to shed further light on this question is to estimate separate
models for each of the four major regions of the Uflited States. Table 3 showed
that the decline in percentage unionized was concentrated in the Northeast,
South, and West; the decline in the Midwest was much more modest. Accordingly,
if growth in the wage gap has been an important cause of the decline in unionism
in construction, the wage gap should either be growing less rapidly or shrinking
in the Midwest relative to the other three regions.
Because of the decreased size of the data sets, the wage gap estimates by
region in Table 6 show greater year-to-year variability than those in Table 5.
To make comparisons over time within each region, the means for 1973-75 and
1980-83 are used rather than the values within each year. These results show
that the proportional reduction in the wage gap was greatest in the Northeast.
In 1973-75 the wage gap was largest in the Northeast; by 1979-81 it was
smallest. However, this cut in the wage gap did not prevent percentage unionized
in the Northeast from declining by a substantial amount. Thewage gap changes
are roughly the same in the Midwest and West despite large differences in the
trend of unionization. Percentage unionized dropped by 12 points in the West; it
declined very little in the Midwest. This evidence makes it even more difficult
to believe that the decline in percentage unionized since 1973 was caused by a
widening wage gap.
The above evidence ignores a potentially important source of labor cost
differences between union and nonunion contractors--employee benefits. Voluntary17
benefits became a rising share of total compensation in the union sector between
1970 and 1980, rising from 11.5 percent of compensation (excluding mandatory
benefits) to 18.8 percent. As a result, wages and voluntary benefits under
collective bargaining increased at an 8.0 percent average annual rate in the
1970s, in contrast to the 7.1 percent rate for wages. Almost all of the growth
in benefits took place between 1970 and 1977.
The impact of this growth in union benefits on the union-nonunion
compensation gap cannot be determined because there are no benefit data for the
nonunion sector. Even if benefits are nonexistent in the open shop, the growth
in union benefits only partially offsets, rather than overrides, the impact of
the post-1978 wage gap reduction on the compensation gap, as shown below:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Union wage
Estimated plus
Union wage, Union-nonunion nonunion voluntary Union-nonunion
journeymen wage ration (from wage benefits compensation gap
Year (from BLS) Table 11, col. 4)(1) (2) (from BLS) (4) (3)
1973 7.62 1.600 4.76 8.83 1.854
1974 8.14 1.555 5.25 9.59 1.826
1975 8.88 1.574 5.64 10.56 1.872
1976 9.48 1.611 5.88 11.43 1.942
1977 10.02 1.603 6.25 12.28 2.091
197810.61 1.595 6.65 13.07 1.965
197911.32 1.432 7.90 13.98 1.768
198012.21 1.504 8.12 15.05 1.85418
V. Changes in the Union-Nonunion Productivity Gap
Evidence in the early 1970s from both micro data on buildings in Allen
(1986) and state by industry aggregates in Allen (1984) shows that productivity
for union contractors is higher than productivity for nonunion contractors. This
productivity gap has been shown by Allen (1987) to be large enough in some cases
to offset the wage gap, making union contractors competitive in terms of unit
cost.
Studies in other industries have shown that productivity gaps can change
considerably over fairly short periods of time. Freeman and Medoff report work
by Jonathan Leonard showing the productivity gap in manufacturing widened from 10
to 31 percent between 1972 and 1977. The productivity gap in bituminous coal
moved in the opposite direction. Connerton, Freeman, and Medoff (1983) find a 33
to 38 percent higher productivity in union mines in 1965. This advantage
evaporated by 1970 and turned into a productivity advantage for nonunion mines of
about 15 to 20 percent in 1975 and 1980.
To determine whether similar changes have taken place in construction, the
1977 and 1982 Census of Construction Industries (CCI) were used to replicate the
results on state by two-digit industry aggregates in Allen (1984). Because
individual states are identified in the CPS starting in 1977, there are now 153
observations, one for each state, instead of the 81 observations used for the
1972 sample. Percentage unionized is obtained from the May 1977-78 CPS for the
1977 CCI and the May 1979-1981 CPS for the 1982 CCI. Wage equations estimated by
sex for nonunion workers were used to compute a labor quality variable for each
state by industry cell as in Allen (1984). The capital-labor ratio and employees
per establishment come from CCI. There is no control for the recentness of the
capital stock because net capital is not reported in the 1977 and 1982 CCI.
Exclusion of this variable from the model for the 1972 sample had no effect on19
the key results, so it is quite unlikely that the absence of this variable will
make comparisons between 1972, 1977, and 1982 misleading. The model also
includes dummies for two-digit industry (2) and region (8).
Two dependent variables are examined: value added per employee and value
added deflated by the Dodge Cost Index per employee. Because of the heavyweight
given to wage rates in the Dodge Index, there is a strong likelihood that the
deflated specification will produce a downwardly biased union coefficient. The
opposite bias is present in the undeflated specification to the extent that the
cost of higher union wage rates is passed on to owners of construction projects
in the form of higher prices rather than being absorbed by contractors in the
form of lower profits. While these biases make it difficult to infer the true
impact of unions on productivity from cross section data, they are irrelevant for
the purpose of examining the change in the impact of unions onproductivity over
time. The same bias will be present in each specification in eachyear, making
the difference in the union coefficients between years in a given specification
an unbiased indicator of the change in the productivity gap.
The union coefficients in both specifications in Table 7 fall substantially
between 1972 and 1982. Value added per employee was 39 percent higher in the
union sector in 1972, but only 21 percent higher in 1977 and 24 percent higher in
1982. In the deflated specification, the productivity gap estimate falls from 17
percent in 1971 to 8 percent in 1977 and 6 percent in 1982. The latter two
estimates are smaller than their standard errors. The decline in the union
coefficient between 1972 and 1982 is similar in both cases: .110 in the
undeflated specification and .099 in the deflated specifications.
A number of other specifications of the model were examined to test the
sensitivity of this result. For instance, one possible explanation for the fall
in the union coefficient is the difference in the levels of aggregation across20
the two samples. Many states had to be combined into regions in the 1972 sample
because they could not be identified in the 1973-75 CPS. If the coefficients
vary across different states, this could account not only for the drop in the
union coefficient but also for the changes in the capital-labor ratio, employees
per establishment, and the labor quality coefficients. In addition, the CPS
sample size for the smallest states may be so small in 1977-78 that there is more
measurement error in the union and labor quality variables in the 1977 sample.
Aggregation might then increase those coefficients.
To see if aggregation was responsible for the difference in the results,
1977 and 1982 data for certain states were aggregated by region in the same way
as in the 1972 sample. This lowered the union coefficient (S.E.) in the 1977
sample to .148 (.080) in the undeflated specification and .051 (.076) in the
deflated specification. In 1982 the union coefficient (S.E.) was .050 (.134) in
the undeflated specification and -.011(.119) in the deflated specification. All
other key coefficients were essentially unchanged in both years. Differences in
aggregation thus clearly are not responsible for the change in the union
coefficient becomes even more pronounced when the same aggregation scheme is used
in all three years. Results for 1982 indicate that the union-nonunion
productivity gap has vanished.
Other aggregation methods that combined some of the smallest states (e.g.,
Vermont and New Hampshire) were also examined, but the basic results were
unaffected. Other tests for sensitivity involving different controls for labor
quality (average age and schooling instead of the predicted wage, no labor
quality variable), different assumptions about the average lifetime of capital
(10 or 20 years instead of 15) and a different union variable (collective
bargaining coverage instead of union membership) were also conducted. All of21
this evidence, available upon request, did not change the basicfinding in Table
7--the union productivity gap vanished between 1972 and 1982.
What are the reasons for the drop in the productivitygap between 1972 and
1982? There is no evidence that the negative effects of unionismon productivity
became more pronounced. Neither strike activity nor thepercentages of workers
covered by agreements limiting or prohibiting subcontracting,limiting or
regulating crew size, or restricting work by nonbargaining unit personnelchanged
over this period. The main sources of the union productivity advantage in the
early 1970s seem to have been better training, better management, and economies
in recruiting and screening provided by the union hiring hall. Possiblechanges
in these factors will be examined in more detail.
Except in a few large firms, there is no evidence of any change intraining
practices over this period in the open shop. Surveys by Northrup (1984) show
that the share of open shop contractors relyingmostly on informal on-the-job
training has not changed. Even the Business Roundtable's 1983report on
construction industry productivity, usually critical of unionism, found fault
with open shop training practices:
Less than 10 percent of those individuals completing construction craft
training programs are being trained in open shop programs. In spite of the
estimate that open shop contractors now perform 60percent of all
construction work.
Less than 10 percent of all funds currently spent intraining construction
craftsmen are directed toward open shop programs.
If the open shop sector of construction remains at thepresent level without
a significant increase in open shop training, there could be long-term
deterioration in the quality and productivity of the construction work
force.
Only in a few areas of the country is open shop construction training
conducted at a level commensurate with the growth ofopen shop construction
activity.
There is only one reason to expect any increase in theaverage training of
workers in the nonunion sector- -theincreased ratio of union members working in
open shop jobs. The unionization variable in Table 7 is based on union22
membership, not on the share of union members working at union wages. One way to
adjust for the rising percentage of union workers employed in the nonunion sector
is to add an interaction term to the model between the union membership variable,
and the percentage of union members working at wages below union scale. This
allows the union coefficient to be a function of the proportion of union members
working in the open shop. One problem in implementing this approach is the small
number of union members in many state by industry cells, which would lead to
severe measurement error bias. To offset this, the proportion of union members
working in the open shop was calculated for each state rather than for each state
by industry cell. This proportion was included in the model directly along with
the interaction term.
When all three sample years are pooled, the coefficient (S.E.) of the
interaction term is -.394(.148) in the deflated specification. Based on this
finding, the increase in the percentage of union members working for nonunion
wages between 1973 and 1981 would result in a decline of the union coefficient of
.066. This accounts for over half the decline in the union coefficient in Table
7.
This result is not as strong in other specifications. For instance, the
coefficient (S.E.) of the interaction term in the undeflated specification is a
much smaller -.225 (.170). Also, when proportion unionized is defined as the
share of construction workers in each state who are union members and are working
at union scale (and the interaction term and the ratio of union members working
in the open shop are dropped from the model), the union coefficient drops by more
than .3 between 1972 and 1982--a bigger decline than that reported in Table 7.
In summary, the increased proportion of union members working in the open
shop probably is partially responsible for the disappearance of the union23
productivity advantage, but the lack of robustness in the resultsusing this
variable suggests that other forces are at work.
Another possible explanation of the disappearance of theunion sector's
productivity advantage is the increased experience open shop contractors have
obtained in doing larger scale projects. Theopen shop initially was
concentrated in residential and small commercial projects.Many open shop
contractors got their first experience with largerprojects in the late l960s and
early 1970s. If there is a learning curve in constructionmanagement, these
contractors would have had much lower productivity initially thanunion
contractors, even with access to the same skilled labor force.Eventually
the productivity gap would narrow as nonunioncontractors gained experience in
larger projects. The validity of this argument cannot be testedempirically.
A final possible explanation of the gap's disappearance isthat the search
economies obtained from use of union hiring halls vanished in theface of high
unemployment rates. Unemployment rates in the constructionindustry rose from
10.3 percent in 1972 to 12.7 percent in 1977 and 20.0percent in 1982. The
validity of this argument is also impossible to assess. The rise inunemployment
between 1972 and 1977 does not seem to be largeenough to account for the drop in
the union coefficient over that period, but the massiveunemployment observed in
1982 may have been enough to eliminate the searcheconomies of hiring halls.
Northrup's surveys indicate that the reliance ofopen shop contractors on
informal contacts and advertising as hiringsources did not change over this
period.
Regardless of the reasons for the decline in the productivitygap, it seems
quite clear that it was a major factor behind the reduction inpercentage
unionized after 1973. Even though thewage gap did not change between 1973 and
1978, the reduced productivity gap gave owners and contractors tremendous24
incentives to switch from union to nonunion labor. It also seems plausible that
the reduction in the wage gap in 1979 and later years could have been a response
to competitive pressures generated by the declining productivity gap.
VI. Conclusion
There are five major empirical findings in this paper:
1.The proportion of construction workers belonging to unions has declined
from slightly less than one-half in 1966 to less than one-third in 1984. The
decline seems to have started after 1970 and continued at a very gradual rate
through 1977. The sharpest drops took place between May 1977 and May 1978 and
between May 1981 and 1985.
2.The market share of union contractors has declined to an even greater
extent than the percentage of union members because of the rising share of union
members who work for nonunion contractors. This share grew from 29 to 46 percent
between 1973 and 1981. While these estimates are highly sensitive to assumptions
about union wage rates, they suggest that the market share of union contractors
fell 10 percentage points between 1973 and 1981 and that only one out of five
construction workers today is a union member working for a union contractor.
3. The decline of unionism in construction is unrelated to changes in
worker characteristics and changes in the mix and location of construction
activity.
4. An important factor behind the initial decline in percentage unionized
is the growth in the union-nonunion wage gap between 1967 and 1973. However, the
gap did not widen any further after 1973 and actually has narrowed substantially
since 1978. Unless market adjustment lags are quite long, the declines in
percentage unionized since 1973 must have been caused by some other factors.25
5.A key factor is the erosion of the productivity advantage of union
contractors, which dropped substantially between 1972 and 1977 and vanished
by 1982. This most likely resulted from the rising share of union members
working for nonunion contractors and the impact of high unemployment rates on the
search economies associated with union hiring halls.
This paper has focused on two of the three forces predicted by the model to
determine levels of unionization. The third force- -changes in the cost of
switching from union to nonunion construction- -may also be quite important,
partly because of changes in pension regulations that make it quite expensive to
leave multiemployer pension plans, but mainly because of the growth in the
number of large union contractors that have gone double-breasted over the last
ten years. A crude estimate of the growth of double-breasting can be calculated
from Northrup's summary of the Engineering News -Record'sannual tabulations of
the 400 largest construction firms. Out of 731 firms surveyed for 1975, 57 (7.8
percent) were double-breasted. By 1980, 73 (18.2 percent) of the top 400
contractors were double-breasted.
The reasons behind the growing share of double-breasted firms are not yet
clear. It may simply be a response to the changing wage and productivity gaps
described above. On the other hand, double-breasting can be viewed either as a
mechanism for diversification or as a legal innovation designed to meet the
letter, if not the spirit, of federal labor legislation. The open shop branch of
a double-breasted firm is supposed to be a separate concern, with its own
offices, management, and payroll. Unions have charged that in many cases these
distinctions are artificial and that the union contract legally applies to the
nonunion subsidiary. Legal outcomes depend on the evidence about the degree of
separation in operations between union and nonunion branches. It would be useful
in future work to examine this phenomenon more closely to see if double-breasting26
has done for unionization in construction what employer unfair labor practices
apparently have done to union organizing success in other industries.
The results of this paper show that economic forces have played a
significant role in the decline of unionism in construction. Methodologically,
they point to the need to examine both wage and productivity (or cost or
profitability) evidence in analyzing the sources of changes in unionization over
time. A key reason behind the decline in the productivity advantage of union
contractors seems to be the rising share of union members working in the open
shop. This study has not addressed the issue of why more union members are
working in the open shop. It is quite rare to see an open shop contractor paying
higher wages than union contractors. Although it is possible that some union
members would seek nonunion jobs for other reasons (e.g. if they were dis-
satisfied with the union), the wage gap between union and nonunion jobs is so
large that it is hard to believe that voluntary mobility has been a key factor.
A stronger possibility is that the shortage of union jobs became more severe as
high interest rates and severe recessions shifted the demand curve for union
labor leftward in the late l970s and 1980s. In response union members took
nonunion jobs because they were the only jobs available.
The findings of this study have an important implication for the future of
unionism in construction. Wage givebacks are not likely to help restore much of
the market share lost in recent years to the open shop. The productivity
advantage of union contractors has eroded to such a degree that the size of the
wage cuts needed to restore a balance between the wage and productivity gapsis
unlikely to be acceptable to rank and file. Instead, the focus of both union
leaders and unionized contractors must be on rebuilding the union productivity
advantage.27
Appendix
This appendix summarizes the methods used to estimate the magnitude of the
sources of upward and downward bias in estimates of the percentage of union
members working in the open shop in Section II:
1A. Freeman (1984) examined measurement error in union status bycomparing
employee and employer responses in the May 1977 CPS. He found that 7.5
percent of persons claiming to be covered by collective bargaining
worked for employers who claimed they were not.
lB. The January 1981 Handbook of Wages and Benefits for Construction Unions
published by the Department of Labor lists wages and estimated
membership for most locals. The percentage of members covered by
agreements offering less than the wage for building construction was
calculated for five of the six skilled trades from which BLS union
rates were taken as well as for laborers. The sixth skilled trade,
plasterers, represented less than 1 percent of the CPS sample of
union workers and was excluded for that reason. The results were as
follows:
Bricklayers 2.9 Painters 2.1
Carpenters 5.0 Plumbers 1.1
Electricians 9.0 Laborers 10.6
The percentages for the five skilled trades were aggregated by their CPS union
employment shares into a single estimate of the percentage of skilled trades
workers covered by agreements offering lower rates than in building
construction. The average of this latter estimate and that for laborers was 6.1
percent, using the CPS union shares of all craftsmen and all operatives and
laborers as weights.
1C. The Handbook reports three skilled trades for whichaverage rates were
below those of painters, who receive the lowest averagewages of any of
the six skilled trades. Members of the locals of these three trades
(floor layers, marble setters, and terrazzo workers) account for 1.8
percent of all skilled trades. No wage data were reported for workers
in operative or unskilled occupations other than laborers (e.g.,
oilers), so the 1.8 percent estimate was assumed to apply there also.
2A. The imputed union wage rate for bricklayers, carpenters, cementmasons,
electricians, iron workers, operating engineers, plasterers, plumbers,
roofers, and sheet metal workers was multiplied by the ratio of the
average wage in that trade, as reported in the Handbook, to the average
wage for painters. This adjusted union wage was then compared to the
wage reported in the CPS to produce new estimates of the percentage


















































The increase in share of union members working the
adjustment is 7.4 percentage points.
open shop arising from this
2B. The average change in wages from July 1 in the previous year to May 1
in the CPS survey year was estimated by prorating the monthly rate of
change of average union wages between July 1 in the previous and July 1
of the current year to the shorter ten month period. The imputed union
wage was then multiplied by the estimated July to May rateof change in
wages to get a new wage to compare to that reported in the CPS.The





























The increase in the share of union members
this adjustment is 7.9 percentage points.
working in the open shop arising from
Interactions between these different sources of bias have not been examined.29
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32.0Table 2. Estintesofuniai nrket share in ccmstructiou, 1973-1981.
Percentage of uniai castruct1a workers
receiving lessthan theuniai wage
Percentage w1 are
Percentage unicti nthers ard
Yearimiai nithers U.S.NDrtheastMidwestSouth West receive uniou wages
1973 44.4 28.9 32.2 32.128.3 22.5 31.6
1974 42.8 28.2 34.3 29.128.3 21.9 30.7
1975 42.6 33.1 37.4 39.936.2 15.4 28.5
1976 41.7 28.6 38.7 27.624.3 26.4 29.8
1977 41.1 29.0 40.9 27.131.8 21.0 29.2
1978 36.6 30.0 33.1 34.233.8 19.1 25.6
1979 37.5 34.9 49.9 35.524.8 29.5 24.4
1980 37.4 34.6 39.6 36.028.3 35.8 24.4
1981 39.0 45.6 52.7 48.440.6 40.2 21.2
32Table 3. Percentage of private wage and salary workers in construction
belonging to unions, by occupational group, region, and year.
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33.6Source: Appendix Table A





1.Age and Schooling 0.6
2.Occupation -2.4
3.SIC 1.2
4.Census division andSMSA residence 0.6
5.Race, sex, maritalstatus -0.8
6.Mix of constructionactivity withinstate 3.4
Predicted change inunionization 2.6
Actual change in unionization -6.635
Table 5. tJriicn-nonunicn wage gap estImates, 1967-1981
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(4), adjusted
Ashenfelter, CPS, (4), wItluit (4), (4), adjusted forunicz CPS,All constructictccstructfrti persc*ial sh1e for collecti've ninbers In Year occupaticms workers workers characteristicsregress ic*i bargaining coverage xnuaicwi sector
1967 37.7
197352.8 53.7 60.0 76.1 87.0 68.0
197451.4 55.0 67.7 82.2 64.0
197554.8 53.7 57.4 70.4 83.7 70.1
197654.8 61.1 76.8 89.1 76.1
197755.3 60.3 75.9 86.4 77.0
197855.0 59.5 74.2 87.2 57.6 70.4
197941.5 43.2 58,9 71.6 41.3 64.7
198047.2 50.4 63.1 73.0 50.7 68.0
198138.8 38.5 51.7 61.6 41.3 57.8
198344.3 45.8 59.7 64.0 44.836
Table 6. Union-nonunion wage gap estimates for construction workers, by region,
1973-1981
Year U.S. Northeast Midwest South West
1973 60.0 67.5 61.0 56.0 56.4
1974 55.0 57.1 52.8 59.8 42.6
1975 57.4 59.8 54.5 57.4 50.4
1976 61.1 46.1 72.3 57.1 57.4
1977 60.3 58.6 62.2 61.6 53.6
1978 59.5 53.7 58.4 57.9 62.9
1979 43.2 42.6 39.4 53.6 46.1
1980 50.4 53.9 45.6 54.3 47.2
1981 38.5 26.6 59.7 40.8 30.7
1983 45.6 44.5 45.8 40.1 50.6
Mean, 1973-75 57.5 61.5 56.1 57.7 49.8
Mean, 1980-83 44.8 41.7 50.4 45.1 42.837






















































































R2 .915 .814 .726 .895 .794
N 81 153
Note: Eachequation also contains an Interceptandtindustryand eightregion diminies. The1972equations
the ratio ofnetto grosscapital.38
Appendix Table A. Union membership equation coefficients and decomposition of sources of
unionization,1973-1981.
Effect on
Standard Mean Mean Change fraction
Variable Coefficient error 1973 1981 1973-81 unionized
1. Labor quality .006
Age .034 .002 35.7 35.1 -0.6 -.020
Age squared
-.00035 .00002 1454 1396 -58 .020
Schooling .0063 .0014 11.6 12.6 1.0 .006
2. Occupation -.024
Professional -.410 .025 .021 .034 .013 -.005
Managerial
-.300 .016 .084 .108 .024 -.007
Sales -.460 .051 .002 .008 .006 -.003
Clerical -.302 .022 .067 .089 .022 -.007
Craftsmen .022 .010 .555 .519 -.036 -.001
Operatives .085 .018 .050 .043 -.007 -.001
Transport
-.005 .021 .031 .026 -.005 *
Service -.162 .052 .004 .005 .001 *
3.Industry .012
SIC 15 -.112 .017 .350 .262 -.088 .010
SIC 16 -.073 .018 .170 .134 -.036 .003
SIC 17 -.088 .016 .477 .483 .006 -.001
4. Location .006
New England -.329 .028 .060 .060 0 0
Middle Atlantic -.199 .025 .156 .115 -.041 .008
E.N. Central -.092 .021 .176 .164 -.012 .001
W.N. Central -.141 .020 .060 .077 .017 -.002
S. Atlantic -.300 .016 .213 .179 -.034 .010
E.S. Central -.224 .023 .072 .061 -.011 .002
W.S. Central -.287 .018 .102 .150 .048 -.014
Mountain -.065 .021 .060 .065 .005 *
SMSA .082 .008 .674 .686 .012 .001
SMSA missing .020 .017
5. Demographics
-.008
Black -.020 .014 .086 .068 -.018 *
Othernonwhite .009 .032 .011 .010 -.001 *
Male .133 .021 .943 .914 -.029 -.004
Married, spouse
present .069 .009 .741 .681 -.060 -.00439
TableA (continued)
Standard Mean Mean Change
Effect on
fraction Variable Coefficient error 1973 1981 1973-81unionized
6. Construction niix
.034
Goverruiient .032 .139 .282 .198 -.084 -.003
Maint., repair 1.566 .232 .110 .179 .069 .108 Homes -.020 .298 .217 .170 -.047 .001
Apartments 1.775 .386 .094 .045 -.049 -.087
Heavy .656 .276 .168 .198 .030 .020
Retail 2.347 .698 .047 .054 .007 .016
Education .807 .414 .063 .030 -033 -.027
Hospital, inst. -.222 .463 .045 .045 0 0
Industrial .251 .337 .124 .135 .011 .003
Office .078 .329 .076 .142 .066 .005














Note: The regression equation was estimated over a sample of 15450persons in
the May 1973-1978 Current Population Survey. The mean (S.D.) of the
dependent variable is .359 (.480). The summary statistics are standard
error, .423; F-ratio, 101.58; and R2, .225.